Thought I'd start a specific thread, as this has been a refreshing off-topic debate recently within other threads.
Some questions raised thus far;
1) was Great Britain actually in danger of being successfully invaded in 1940?
2) who had the most powerful naval forces?
Feel free to widen the debate.
I'll start by adding my post re the Battle of Britain.
Some questions raised thus far;
1) was Great Britain actually in danger of being successfully invaded in 1940?
2) who had the most powerful naval forces?
Feel free to widen the debate.
I'll start by adding my post re the Battle of Britain.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Chief Brody (Post 13933813)
Try James Holland.
In-Exile is quite right that the Home Fleet was a significant concern of the Germans in preventing invasion. Without air superiority, an invasion fleet would have been seriously compromised. To begin, RAF fighters (Hurricanes and Spitfires) were being built in increasing numbers in 1940 and were at least the equivalent of the Bf109e & Bf110c. German intelligence underestimated GB fighter production badly. By Dunkirk, Fighter Command had also gained valuable experience in combat with the Luftwaffe, causing it significant losses. More importantly, the infrastructure set up by the 'Dowding System', was an incredibly effective strategy in winning air superiority and exacerbated the operational problems faced by Luftflottes 2 (South) and 5 (North). Intelligence was critical to our success. Enigma for strategic understanding of composition of Luftwaffe. Whilst in combat, the Dowding System operated thus - Chain Home (radar) and Observer Corps reports went to Bentley Priory, were distilled and communicated to Group HQs and thus Sector Stations. On the ground, Group Commanders would select Squadrons to attack respective targets. Sector Ops would guide fighters to intercept with a 75%+ chance of success throughout the Battle. In contrast, German intelligence was largely poor and they often went in blind or with limited info. They lost many a/c on recon missions that were easy prey for RAF. Ensuring the limited info was maintained. The operational and production strengths of the RAF though, were undermined by poorer, inflexible tactics. The Germans were far superior in that regard (as, was often the case in other Arms too). A German mistake was believing the Dowding System was as inflexible and rigid as RAF tactical doctrine. It wasn't. One reason why RAF tactics were so poor was that they expected bombers over GB, not fighters too. Outdated thinking from '30s. Tight 'vic 3' formation etc ('rows of idiots' according to LW pilots) and easy prey for LW 'finger four' of x2 pairs. RAF doctrine was straight jacket like in comparison to flexibility of LW combat style. Squadron Leader Sailor Malan copied the LW formations that was adopted more widely by the RAF, so imitation and flattery etc helped reduce a key strength of the LW Geschwader. Other well known issues for the LW other than poor intelligence and inferior a/c production was the loss of aircrew over the UK and Channel. The RAF lost over 200 pilots in the Channel, let alone German losses. Summary of BoB phases; 1) Kanalkampf (Channel Battles) 10 Jul - 11 Aug 2) Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack vs coastal airfields) 12 Aug - 23 Aug 3) Phase 3 interior airfields attacked 24 Aug - 06 Sep 4)* Phase 4 attacks switch to towns and cities 07 Sep onwards *The period 13-19 September saw Bomber Command sink 200+ invasion barges. By mid August the LW had reviewed the Battle and withdrew JU87s and reduced Bf110s. A clear sign of RAF fighter superiority. (Luftflotte 5 (North) were mauled around this time and did not re-appear in strength after this.) That's why Phase 3 had the most ferocious attacks against our airfields, as the LW had to break Fighter Command and the integrity of the Dowding System. The key element to defeat was the supply of RAF fighter pilots. Hence, newly trained guys had as little as 9 hours flying time with no combat training. Foreign pilots and transfers from Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm helped the bloodflow of men. A/c production and the quality of its machines meant this we were never in danger of being second to the LW in this regard. It was the one real opportunity for the LW, but given the previous detail provided, this was increasingly unlikely to succeed. So, in hindsight, no, we were never really in danger of German invasion, but at the time, and given Dunkirk, it's understandable it was a concern. |
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